ISSN 1944-9488
Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2004December 31, 2003 EDT
An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents
An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents
Articles in Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2004
Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2004
- Guessing Secrets with Inner Product QuestionsLinyuan LuFan ChungRonald Graham
- Smaller Explicit SuperconcentratorsM. CapalboN. Alon
- Coupling Scale-Free and Classical Random GraphsBéla BollobásOliver Riordan
- Admission Control to Minimize RejectionsAvrim BlumJon KleinbergAdam Kalai
- An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter AgentsKunal TalwarAaron ArcherÉva TardosChristos Papadimitriou
- Infinite Limits of Copying Models of the Web GraphJeanette JanssenAnthony Bonato
- A Brief History of Generative Models for Power Law and Lognormal DistributionsMichael Mitzenmacher
Talwar, Kunal, Aaron Archer, Éva Tardos, and Christos Papadimitriou. 2004. “An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents.” Internet Mathematics 1 (2). https://doi.org/10.1080/15427951.2004.10129086.